There is a`premium' on planning for retirement to be reaped by those willing and able to plan whatever the state of financial markets. For theorists, people are ready and able to plan for the futureötheir apparent self-interest in realising life-time consumption goals is believed to be sufficient to motivate planning now and in the future. If the bedrock of standard microeconomic theory, some years ago Deaton (1992) raised doubts about the extent to which observed patterns of income, consumption, and saving were consistent with the permanent income hypothesis (compare Scholz et al, 2006) . Similarly, those writing at the interface between psychology and economics have raised doubts about individuals' decision-making competence in the context of risk and uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . To the extent people have well-defined discount functions many still find it difficult to marshal the requisite cognitive resources to carry through on plans for the future (Ainslie, 2005) .
Inspired by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007; , in this paper we tackle a subset of issues at the heart of this research. On the basis of a 2006 representative random sample of UK working men and women aged 18^59 years who participate in employer-sponsored supplementary pension schemes, we show the correlates of (1) the importance attributed by respondents to retirement planning, (2) the degree to which respondents believe they are able to plan, and (3) their knowledge of annuities (financial instruments which convert accumulated savings into a guaranteed income stream until death). In so doing, we clarify what is meant by pension planning, with implications for the structure of our analysis; we explain the logic of the data and statistical procedures used to produce the results; and we offer an interpretation of the results, emphasising the sophistication of financial judgment, the salience of the issue for respondents' welfare, and the scale at which respondents make planning decisions.
We found that the older the respondent, the higher their income, and the degree to which they are to recognise pensions are designed to supplement retirement income, the more likely they are to believe planning to be important, to be prepared for planning, and to be knowledgeable about annuities. The scale of effective retirement planning is the household örespondents with a spouse claiming similar entitlements are more likely to believe planning for retirement is important. By contrast, remote sources of planning advice and information carry less weight for our respondents than expert advice relevant to the circumstances of respondents' households. These findings reinforce arguments by Strauss (2008b) about the importance of social differentiation and scale for behaviour under risk and uncertainty. These results also give weight to Bathelt and Glu« ckler's (2005) `relational' theory of economic geography, albeit embedded in personal relationships of commitment or contract.
We recognise that this research comes at a time of global financial crisis. If profound questions have been raised about the financial integrity of private funded pensions, our study provides, nonetheless, a benchmark against which we can judge the behavioural responses to these cataclysmic events now and in the future. See Clark et al (2010) for a study of the investment intentions of defined contribution pension plan participants who, by virtue of their market location, were able to anticipate the consequences of the bubble in UK housing prices.
Rationality and planning
The behavioural revolution associated with Kahenman and Tversky (1979) and Simon (1956) claims to have broken the nexus between substantive rationality (human nature) and procedural rationality (behaviour in context). On the basis of experimental psychology, analysts have sought to identify and explain the scope of behavioural`anomalies' and biases' thereby challenging the assumption that human rationality (in substance) maps onto, in an unproblematic way, human behaviour. Krueger and Funder (2004) identified more than forty such biases; the list is growing as experimental procedures become more refined. Moreover, the work of Kahneman and Tversky and others indicates that many people are not particularly effective decision makers under risk and uncertainty. This is important for a variety of reasons, including the fact that so many people's retirement income is dependent upon their ability to function in global financial markets subject to costly episodes of unanticipated market volatility (Langley, 2008) .
While there is little direct evidence that social status is correlated with certain types of behavioural anomalies and biases, there is evidence that consistency of decision making is correlated with domain-specific skills and expertise (Wagner, 2002) . This finding has implications for the quality of individual financial decision making, including the selection of those responsible for long-term investment . Unclear, at present, is whether people are cognitively predisposed to perform certain types of tasks and functions more or less well [Kahneman's (2003) argument], whether commonsense and experience can make up for cognitive shortfalls [Gigerenzer's (2004) argument for the significance of heuristics], and whether education can be effective in self-regulating acknowledged behavioural biases [Doherty's (2003) optimistic scenario]. Nonetheless, we can hypothesise that, all things being equal, a resource-rich environment can compensate for people's acknowledged shortcomings in behavior and/or knowledge and experience [as suggested by Hershey et al (2008) ].
In cognitive science, planning for the future is similarly assumed to be a human trait. In fact, it is widely believed that this cognitive function is located in the frontal lobes of the brain wherein self-control and ancillary functions provide subconscious mechanisms for governing individual behaviour. Often invoked at this juncture are case studies and, in particular, the celebrated case of one Phineas Gage who experienced frontal lobe trauma, survived, but then exhibited quite erratic behaviour (Libet, 2004) . (1) For some, this trait has its origins in human evolutionöspecifically the claimed innate commitment in favour of the conservation of human life (a selfish interest) and/or the protection of progeny (perhaps an altruistic interest). We note, as well, the premium placed on time-dependent behaviour traced by historians and geographers back to the Industrial Revolution and to contemporary market imperatives driving the measurement of time and planning for the future. Calibrating the value of time is a practice deeply embedded in everyday life (Thrift and Glennie, 2004) .
Whatever the contemporary significance or otherwise of planning, we can generally agree with Bratman (1987, page 8) when he says that``we are planning creatures. We form future-directed intentions as parts of larger plans, plans which play characteristic roles in coordination and ongoing practical reasoning; plans which allow us to extend the influence of present deliberation to the future.'' However, we must take care to be clear about the scope of our agreement and about where there may remain disagreement about the significance of intention and the scope of planning.
In much of the social science literature, planning is seen as a means to an end which combines deliberation with an overarching future-oriented optimising framework. We ought to be cautious about the generality of this framework for three reasons. First, just because we are`planning creatures' does not necessarily mean that we are conscious of related actions; planning could well be a finely honed intuition which is used day in and day out without agents ever being aware that this is what we should do in situations X, Y, and Z. Second, planning need not be intuition or a fixed repertoire (1) A detailed description of the case and the implications of Gage's head trauma for understanding the status of foresight and planning are to be found in Damasio (1994) and Damasio et al (1994) . The interaction between canonical cases and the tried-and-tested evidence gleaned from controlled experiments is important in psychology and cognitive science, if not the social sciences such as economics, politics, and (to an extent) economic geography.
of actions that originates with the person who takes action; planning could involve the imitation and emulation of others' actions and outcomes such that the individual concerned neither deliberates over actions to imitate nor consciously makes a choice of those he or she wishes to emulate (Hurley, 2008) . Third, planning may be an illusion; it presupposes control over the relevant decision variables and related environment (Wenger, 2002) .
If planning is simply a process of matching day-to-day imperatives with a repertoire of possible actions in response, or is a largely unproblematic process of imitating others' actions given their place in our immediate field of vision, there would seem to be much less to planning than imagined by social scientists. But if planning is responsive to the salience of the issue and demands the sophisticated application of knowledge outside of commonplace routines, planning may well claim significant cognitive resources such as attention and deliberation (see Gabaix et al, 2006) . If so, we should also recognise that people are not equally endowed with either the cognitive resources or the social resources to make good on intended actions and outcomes.
The planning process For heuristic purposes, we can classify human planning by reference to the nature and significance of the issue (salience), distinguishing between the routine and the important; and to the nature and significance of the cognitive resources used in the planning process (sophistication), distinguishing between the use of`fast and frugal' techniques such as intuition and the use of decision techniques which require consciousness and deliberation. So, for example, in figure 1 the upper left-hand box identifies a type of planning (type 1) that is both commonplace and largely incremental in its positive and negative effects. By contrast, the bottom right-hand box identifies a type of planning (type 4) that is demanding in terms of its use of cognitive resources and possibly very important in terms of its long-term effects on human welfare. There are, no doubt, people who occupy the spaces set aside for type 2 and type 3: planning deploying scarce cognitive resources to make routine plans (being cautious), and responding to significant issues without the benefit of conscious deliberation (being impulsive).
But what drives the planning process? Standard treatments of the topic begin with beliefs and desiresöthese being states of mind that have, presumably, three characteristics (Bratman, 1987, page 22) : they control conduct; they are relatively consistent or stable over the flow of life-events; and they provide the impetus for action. There is no need for beliefs and desires to be anything more than a set of prior commitments which may or may not be recognised as such by agents. For example, a basic belief or desire may be self-preservation. Another belief or desire may be the love and respect of others. From beliefs and desires come intentions to realise those interests. By this logic, intention is the transfer function between motivation and action wherein the latter is the expression of the former in concrete form. For intention to be effective, people need the cognitive resources consistent with realising their interests as well as the social resources to sustain the chosen action or actions that are intended to realise the underlying beliefs and desires. There are many instances where people's beliefs and desires are frustrated by poor reasoning and a lack of resources. Bratman's model of`commonsense' planning is amenable to the application of optimisation methods, and it has a recipe for public policy. But whether it is, in fact, consistent with the evidence as to how people make and execute plans is open to dispute. One problem has to do with the origin of beliefs and desires. In the aforementioned account, beliefs and desires are distinct from cognitive processes öbeing primal urges, emotional commitments, or metaphysical incantations. For some, beliefs and desires reside in the mind whereas cognition resides in the brain. But, as we know, this is a categorical mistake (Ryle, 1949) . In any event, recent research in the cognitive sciences disputes the plausibility of a sequential order to the planning process as set out above. Libet (2004) contends, on the basis of experimental evidence, that we act before we recognise that we have decided to act.`Intention' may be backwards looking rather than forward looking. This is not to say that consciousness and deliberation are superficial behavioural traits more related to self-justification than to calculated action. In fact, the experimental evidence suggests that consciousness and deliberation play vital roles in governing behaviouröespecially in cases where agents take the time to check on their initial impulses or plans of action and revise these according to their circumstances (Bratman, 2007) . In this sense, type-2 and type-4 planning are second-order versions of type-1 and type-3 planning, being sophisticated expressions of self-conscious deliberation where salience (at some threshold value) governs the level of attention paid to the issue at hand (see Pacherie, 2006) . Whether people articulate the differences between these types of planning is debateable. Those who hold to a strong version of rationality believe that people have a ready grasp of their relevance and act accordingly. Others are not so sanguine [as indicated by the logic of the Interim Report of the UK Pensions Commission (2004)].
Many people neither appreciate the importance of pension saving nor are equipped to make informed decisions, especially when dealing with complex financial products such as annuities (Poterba, 2006) . Idealising planning capacity may be a recipe for na|« ve decision making (type-1), self-defeating decision making (type-2), and shortterm decision making (type-3). Employers, concerned about their responsibility for the decisions made by their employees, may auto-enrol employees and offer opt-out options to those self-confident about their knowledge and understanding of the issues (ie type-4 planners). As we know, most people do not exercise their opt-out right just as most participants in employer-sponsored pension saving schemes do not exercise their right to make investment decisions. There may be type-2 planners who claim the right to deliberate and decideörecognising this possibility, the employer could make the opt-out option difficult to understand and time-consuming to execute such that employee impulsiveness is constrained by the structure of the decision-making process.
In effect, those who use auto-enrolment to structure employee pension saving decision making take advantage of the fact that most people are`on automatic pilot' when it comes to planning for the future (Clark and Knox-Hayes, 2009). Likewise, those who advocate stepwise time-dependent escalation devices to increase the rate of pension saving appear to assume that most people are type-1 planners. That is, it is assumed that most people can accommodate incremental changes in pension contribution rates within the mix of issues they regularly respond to on a month-to-month or year-to-year basis. Benartzi and Thaler's (2005) formula for employer-sponsored defined contribution schemes assumes that most people are not type-4 planners (this being one justification for employers and governments to take a more active and paternal interest in the long-term consequences of people's choices).
Framing the empirical analysis
The application of conscious deliberation to retirement planning depends, in part, upon agents' recognition of the significance of the issues at hand. In this paper we consider whether our survey respondents appreciate the significance of retirement planning, have the necessary resources to plan, and have the knowledge and understanding appropriate to purchasing annuitiesöa type of financial product directly relevant to preserving the accumulated value of retirement savings through a guaranteed income stream (Sheshinski, 2008) . Here, as in other related studies, we use a random survey of relevant respondents to test their views on these three matters, and evaluate opinion against their socioeconomic status and risk preferencesöproxies for the resources available for making planning decisions.
The baseline survey was designed to capture respondents' attitudes and behavioural predispositions with respect to pension and retirement-income saving and investment. Sponsored by our CASE partner Mercer Human Resource Consulting (London), a commercial polling company was contracted to implement a national representative survey of working men and women between the ages of 18 and 59 years currently enrolled in some form of employer-sponsored retirement plan. The initial goal was to obtain over 1200 completed surveys. In fact, 937 survey responds were obtained. Many problems were encountered in finding a representative sample of respondents who were able and willing to spend time with interviewers [explained in detail in Strauss (2008c) ]. While the age and gender characteristics of survey respondents approximated national patterns, respondents were weighted towards older age groups and towards women.
It has been shown elsewhere that there are systematic age and gender effects on risk attitudes and putative asset-allocation decisions (Clark and Strauss, 2008) . Similarly, we have found that gender, income, and household status interact such that men are more risk tolerant than women; older higher income men are more risk tolerant than middle-aged higher income men; and younger lower income women are more risk adverse than older higher income women. These findings are similar to those found in other countries such as Germany (see Dohman et al, 2005) . We also found a significant`household effect', in that men and women who have a spouse with some form of pension entitlement engage in risk sharing within the household. It would appear that they`plan'öeither in response to their circumstances (weighted by gender, age, and income), or by deliberate policies of risk management with respect to desired long-term household retirement income (also weighted by gender, age, and income). Here, we interrogate this implication directly with tests both of the importance attributed to planning and of respondents' preparedness.
About eighty questions were asked of respondents. After an introductory question which sought their agreement to the interview (`yes' or`no' responses), those agreeing to participate were asked two`qualifying' questions. S1:``First can I just check, are you currently working in an organisation with at least 10 employees worldwide?'' Yes ö Continue; NoöTerminate. S3A[S]:``The survey concerns pensions and benefits at work, do you currently have any form of pension?'' YesöContinue; NoöTerminate. Thereafter, a series of questions were asked to establish respondents' type or types of pension plans, and those who indicated that they currently participated in defined-benefit or final-salary schemes were excluded. The reason for this was that we intended that the survey concentrate on those for whom their own pension planning would have tangible benefits: those who, by the nature of the employer-sponsored pension plan, have personal responsibility for risk taking and for the expected value of the accumulated pool of retirement assets.
A set of questions established respondents' gender, age, location, job type, household status, annual income, and spousal pension entitlement. Question 9[S] asked respondents to strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree, or N/A with the statement:``Planning for my retirement is an important issue for me.'' Thereafter, a series of similar statements were posed designed to elicit respondents' preparedness or otherwise for long-term retirement planning. For example, statement 10[S] was``I know where to get more information about planning for my retirement if I need to''; and statement 12 [S] was``my understanding of the savings and investment options available for long-term financial planning is reasonably good (or better).'' Based on a string of eight related statements, an index of preparedness was constructed using the response options noted above to create a respondent-specific score on preparedness (explained in the appendix).
A set of questions were posed to elicit respondents' attitudes to risk, investment, and annuities. As in Clark and Strauss (2008) , risk tolerance was determined by asking respondents (Question 25 [S] ) to choose either``I aim to get the best possible growth in the value of my savings, even if that means taking some risks which could cause my savings to fall in value'' (designated`risk tolerant'); or``I prefer to have safe and secure savings and investments, even if that means they do not grow in value as much as they could'' (designated`risk averse'), or``N/A''. Mixed in with a series of questions regarding their knowledge and understanding of different types of investment funds, including cash, bonds, and equities, was question 27[S]:``If you retired today, you would be required to use your pension savings to buy an annuity. How good is your understanding of what an annuity is?'' Respondents were given the following response options: very good, good, neither good nor poor, poor, very poor, and N/A.
Note, in a related study using different data, Clark and Knox-Hayes (2007) found evidence of`regional ecologies of finance' with respect to the intended purchase of annuities [confirming the work of Leyshon et al (2004; 2006) ]. For this paper, we sought to determine if there was a discernable scale (individual, household, or regional) at which pension planning takes place [see also Sunley's (2000) regional map of UK pension potentials].
Summary of empirical findings
We began with a model designed to predict the importance of planning to respondents, using the ordinal logistic regression estimation technique processed through the Stata statistical package. The results are summarised in table 1 in which variables found significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels are indicated. For the interpretation of results, a statistically significant negative sign on the estimated parameter of being female means that, compared with men, women were less likely to attribute importance to pension planning. Note, for categorical variables we used a baseline case, as in respondent income, to calibrate the relative significance of different levels of income. In table 1 the log odds coefficient of 0.63 on the AGE 30^39 years category indicates that being between the ages of 30 to 39 years increases the log odds of being in a higher planning category by 63% (compared with the reference group). The related odds ratio of 1.88 indicates that the odds of being in a higher planning category should be multiplied by 1.88 if the person is 30 to 39 years old (compared with the reference group). Strength of significance: *** p`0X01; ** p`0X05; * p`0X1. Significant variables shown in boldface.
As widely recognised in the literature, it was found that AGE was statistically significant, with parameter signs and estimated values indicating that the older the respondent the more likely he or she is to believe planning to be important. It was found that GENDER was statistically significant, though at a weaker level than other significant variables, and suggested that women are less likely than men to believe pension planning to be important. INCOME was also statistically significant, with the likelihood of indicating planning being increasingly important with increasing income. By contrast, it was found that neither REGION of residence nor the expected REPLACEMENT rate of income supplements from pension saving were statistically significant. (2) Below, it is shown that respondents' REGION of residence does appear significant in other cases but not to the extent found by Clark and Knox-Hayes (2007) .
As indicated above, we sought to determine respondents' RISK tolerance in saving because of a question that gave a dichotomous choice. It was found that RISK-tolerant respondents were more likely to believe that pension planning is important. We also posed a related question about personal responsibility for asset allocation. Question 48[S] began by noting that it is`sensible' for people to shift their assets out of``highrisk assets such as equities'' as they approach retirement. Respondents were given five response options including (1) leaving the choice and strategy with the respondent, (2) leaving the choice with the respondent but with provider advice on strategy, (3) leaving the decision with the provider; (4) don't know; and (5) n/a. This is a significant issue, which has implications for the conservation of accumulated wealth and the translation of pension savings into an annuity. (3) Respondent attitudes with respect to the desired level of responsibility for age-related retirement-saving management were not significant either for the importance of pension planning (preparedness), or for their knowledge and understanding of annuities.
Consistent with Clark and Strauss (2008) , we found that respondents with a SPOUSE also entitled to supplementary pensions are more likely to believe that pension planning is important, just as those respondents who indicated that they will be RELYING upon another for retirement welfare were found to be less likely to believe that pension planning is important. As for information in pension planning, those who used INFORMATION sources other than a pension specialist are less likely to believe that pension planning is important. This was especially apparent for those who used more geographically remote sources of information, such as the Internet and booklets. Interestingly, it seems that bank advisors were less effective in this respect than insurance company representatives. Table 2 summarises the strength of the estimated coefficients for the predicted probabilities on the significant variables. For the binary variables the predicted probabilities estimate the likelihood of being in a specific category when the binary variable is`active' (holding all other variables constant to their mean). For the SPOUSAL variable, the probability of being in the strongly agreed category (that planning is important) increases by 10.2% when respondents has a spouse with a pension entitlement. For nominal variables, the predicted probability is specified with an`if statement' for each category. The predicted probability of being in the strongly agreed that (2) REGION was coded using respondents' STD identifiers, based upon the Office of National Statistics UK regions (see http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/downloads/GB_GOR98_A4.pdf). (3) Answers to this question have significant implications for the design of defined contribution savings schemes which use asset allocation rebalancing systems dependent upon participants' age and expected years to retirement (Bodie and Treussard, 2007) . Whether participants take an interest in the`glide path' to retirement, and whether plan sponsors should institute systems that do so automatically, are issues to be resolved in the design of such systems [especially in the UK (see Byrne et al, 2007) ].
planning is important category increases by 22.2% if the respondent's AGE is 50 years or more. For ordinal variables, the predicted probability of being in a response category is calculated using a one-unit increase against the mean of the ordinal predictor. The probability of strongly agreeing that planning is important decreases by 11% with a one-unit increase in RELYING upon another.
Turning to planning preparedness, table 3 summarises the results of the OLS regression using the same set of variables. In this case, AGE and INCOME were significant (as before), although it was found that the parameters on younger age groups were not significant whereas the parameters on lower income groups were significant. As anticipated, the older the respondent and the higher their income the more likely they were to indicate that they are prepared for pension planning. In this instance, however, other variables are significant, including the parameter on REGION (but just the South West) and, importantly, respondents' expectations as to the income REPLACEMENT rate of their pension savings. That is, the higher the expected value of respondents' pension savings with respect to earned income, the more likely the respondents were to indicate preparedness for pension planning. In this case GENDER was not significant.
Again, RISK tolerance is found to be highly significant and positive in effectö although the parameter value is less than half that found in the previous analysis. And, once again, respondents with a SPOUSE entitled to a pension benefit are positively disposed to planning preparedness whereas those RELYING on others for retirement income were more likely to indicate less preparedness. Consistent with the findings summarised in table 1, compared with a pension specialist, those reliant on other sources of INFORMATION are less likely to be prepared for planning. In this case, though, many more sources of information are found to be significant and it was difficult to discern a pattern in terms of the estimated value of the relevant parameters. Intriguingly, those who would rely upon a colleague or relative and those who would rely on a manager in their organisation for information are less likely to indicate preparedness than were those reliant upon booklets and the media. In the next section Strength of significance: *** p`0X01; ** p`0X05; * p`0X1; significant variables shown in boldface. Strength of significance: *** p`0X01; ** p`0X05; * p`0X1; significant variables shown in boldface.
we suggest one interpretation of this finding: a colleague or relative might be the second port of call öafter respondents' spouses. Tables 4 and 5 summarise the results from our ordinal logistic regression analysis of the correlates of respondents' knowledge of annuities. These are consistent with the previous results in that AGE, INCOME, REPLACEMENT, and REGION (weak) of residence have the same signs as before and are significant predictors of the likelihood that respondents have knowledge of the structure and design of annuities. Also significant are RISK tolerance, INFORMATION sources, and RELYING on others for pension income upon retirement. But notice that neither GENDER nor the SPOUSAL entitlement is significant, and INFORMATION sources other than a pension specialist are of limited number and significance. In this case, the two significant sources are a colleague or relative and a manager in the organisation. Generic and institutional sources of annuity information are not statistically significant.
To give a better indication of the strength of the coefficients we also calculated predicted probabilities of significant variables (table 5). For the binary variable RISK the predicted probabilities estimate the probability of having a specific category of knowledge of annuities when the binary variable is active (holding all other variables constant at their mean). For RISK the probability of having a good knowledge of annuities increases by 15.4% when respondents indicated RISK tolerance. For nominal variables, the predicted probability is again specified with an`if ' statement for each category. For example, the predicted probability of indicating a`good' knowledge of annuities increases by 19.7% if the respondent's AGE is 50 years or older. For ordinal variables, the predicted probability of being in each category is calculated with a 1 unit increase (centred around the mean) in the ordinal predictor. So, the probability of having a good knowledge of annuities decreases by 2.9% with a one-unit (mean-centred) increase in RELYING on another. Strength of significance: *** p`0X01; ** p`0X05; * p`0X1; significant variables shown in boldface.
Sophistication, salience, and scale
Comparing results across the three issues considered, table 6 provides a list of the independent variables, their statistical significance by issue, and the sign on the estimated parameters. There was a high degree of consistency in results with respect to the significance of selected independent variables and the signs on estimated parameters. Further, there were some interesting results. For example, although the literature on decision making suggests that men and women have different levels of risk tolerance (risk aversion), the GENDER variable was only weakly significant for the importance of planning and was insignificant otherwise (see Bajtelsmit, 2006 ). Whereas we showed in a larger study devoted to the intended take-up of annuities in the aftermath of the 1990s bubble and bust that REGION of residence was a significant factor in discriminating between respondents (Clark and Knox-Hayes, 2007) , here the effect was weaker and less systematic. In all cases the signs on the estimated parameters were the same and most estimated parameters were significant at the 95% or 99% confidence levels. We now turn to interpretation of the results. Like others writing on financial behaviour and pension saving (see Agarwal et al, 2008) , our interpretations are suggestive rather than definitive. Further, as argued above, care must be taken not to overinterpret the results in the sense of attributing intentionality to each and every factor in the pension-planning process. In our interpretation, we distinguish three types of effects or aspects of pension planning, beginning with RISK tolerance. It has been noted many times that people are risk adverse öa core empirical finding underpinning the behavioural revolution in the social sciences (Baron, 2008) . Here, it was found that those indicating RISK tolerance (as opposed to risk aversion) were more likely to believe pension planning to be important, were prepared for pension planning, and had good or very good knowledge of annuities. This suggests that financial sophistication may be a precondition for deliberate pension planning.
From table 6, it is also apparent that AGE, INCOME, and recognition of the role of pension savings in the REPLACEMENT of earned income are significant. The older a respondent, the more likely he or she is to believe that pension planning is very important. If intuitively plausible, this result does not accord entirely with theoretical expectations derived from the permanent-income hypothesis (see Deaton, 1992) . It seems that, as people come closer to retirement, they are either more conscious of the need to plan for the near future, or, more likely, they recognise the costs of not having planned adequately for retirement in the past. The INCOME effect reinforces the AGE result: either people seek to conserve their accumulated well-being, and/or they fear for their standard of living over the near future. (4) The effect of REPLACEMENT on retirement planning is simpler: given the similar size of statistically significant coefficients of different replacement rates, it would seem that it is sufficient to recognise that pension saving is designed to replace earned income. Each variable is indicative of the salience of pension planning (see also Gabaix et al, 2006) . Perhaps the most interesting set of significant predictors of pension planning are those that refer to the scale of decision making. As we have noted previously (Clark and Strauss, 2008) , some respondents are clearly influenced by the existence of a SPOUSAL pension entitlement. This could mean that there is mutual learning between partners. (5) As such, the relevant retirement income planning unit could, in fact, be the household not the individual. It could also mean that individuals are aware, or become aware, that their long-term welfare is a function of their partner's survival prospects (see, generally, Friedberg and Webb, 2006) . (6) Reinforcing this result is the fact that some respondents intend to RELY upon others for their retirement, discounting the value they attribute to their own pension planning while implicitly or explicitly placing a premium on others' best intentions and planning capacity.
That there is such an intimate scale to pension planning is a significant result compared with the relative lack of significance attributed to REGION of residence. Just as important in this respect, however, are the results on the sources of pensionplanning INFORMATION. Against the base case, a pension specialist, other sources of pension-planning information were found to be less likely to contribute to a sense that planning is important and that respondents were prepared for planning. Notably, insurance company advisors and bank advisors were deemed to be more likely to prompt respondents to suggest that pension planning is important than were geographically remote sources of information such as the media and the Internet. It was harder to draw this implication from the results on preparedness, although it should be noted that a pension specialist is clearly a more important source of information than is a relative or colleague.
On annuities, it would seem that the only other source of information of value to respondents was a colleague or relative öbut note the small size of the parameter. We would contend that the significance attributed to pension specialists is a similar effect to SPOUSAL entitlement and RELIANCE on othersöin this instance, though, regulated by contract and fee-for-service, rather than intimacy.
(4) It is possible that older, higher income people have a better sense of what can be achieved by pension saving because of their life-time success and/or the fact that there is a clear cause-andeffect relationship between pension saving (now) and retirement income (near future) given a declining capacity to earn higher income. See Wenger (2002, chapter 3) on the psychological relationship between individual experience and the perception of agency which is amplified by the consistency of success. (5) An intimate interest in another's pension prospects may prompt discussion of the implications of different pension-saving options and the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Each may think it necessary to justify his or her plans, thereby linking in a deliberate fashion plans with intended outcomes (separately and together), see Pettit (2007) on the virtues of discursive deliberation. (6) This result suggests the existence of implicit or explicit tontine-like household pension planning. A tontine is a club for mutual insurance wherein those who begin in the club bet on their survival against other members such that, as club members die, those surviving receive larger and larger shares of income until the person who out lives all others gets the benefit of all members' initial investment. It was a common form of`pension' saving in England during the Middle Ages, and has some relevance even today (see Goldsticker, 2007; Sheshinski, 2008) .
We would also contend that there is evidence for another consistent but negative scale effect. According to our respondents, generic information sources such as the media and the Internet, are not as highly valued as sources of information as are those that come from direct contact with advisorsöalbeit they may be less knowledgeable about the specific issues related to pension planning. If systematic across the UK, this finding suggests that a``national money guidance service'', as recommended by the Thoresen Review (2008), may be ineffective unless remote sources of information are complemented with personal advice from truly independent professional sources.
Implications and conclusions
Too often, biological predisposition is presumed to extend through to actual behaviour, ignoring the cognitive and social resources necessary for effective decision making as well as the role that context plays in channeling behaviour (see Goldstein et al, 2001) . In any event, we have suggested that too much is made of conscious deliberation invoking recent research in the cognitive sciences to suggest that`planning' can be the expression of routine signal-response mechanisms that govern human behaviour: people may plan, but may do so without the conscious deliberation often assumed by theorists.
There is a type of planning that is a self-conscious check on impulse and intuitionöeven if Kahneman (2003) believes impulse and intuition to be the best available solutions to decision-related tasks, pension and retirement-saving decisions carry important implications for long-term welfare. As a consequence, it is crucial for public and private institutions to set prompts and incentives for people to take account of the likely results of their planning decisions (however arrived at) (see Benartzi and Thaler, 2005) . More optimistic analysts, writing in the wake of the behavioural revolution, argue or seek to show that most people develop appropriate and informed, if not optimal, solutions to common planning problems (Doherty, 2003; Gigerenzer, 2004) . In this case, it may be useful to know about the correlates of respondents' attitudes to pension planning as a guide to designing effective public policy.
In this paper we have shown that there are three types of significant correlates of pension planning. There are correlates, such as risk tolerance, that are indicative of respondent financial sophistication: as in many other studies of expertise and intelligence, those who understand the substantive foundations of financial decision making may be, all other things being equal, more likely to recognise the importance of pension planning (compare with Wagner, 2002) . Just as important are factors that drive the salience of pension planning for respondents, matching a related argument made by Gabaix et al (2006) to the effect that salience is crucial given the cognitive and resource costs of deliberation. Those who recognise that pension planning is important are those who have the most to lose from not planning. Perhaps this reflects Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) finding about the importance of loss aversion in decision making under risk and uncertainty.
For pension planning, scale counts: that is, with household relationships and with knowledgeable advisors, but not at the workplace (compare Bernheim, 1998) . There is a certain intimacy to these particular relationships that adds value to respondents' confidence in pension planning. By contrast, respondents tended to discount the value of generic sources of information compared with that of specialist advisors. This is, of course, consistent with the fact that skills and expertise are domain specific: by training and education, or by virtue of the tacit knowledge embedded in certain roles and responsibilities, it is not surprising that respondents value pension specialists over bank advisors and insurance company salespersons. Whether respondents do, in fact, recognise this logic is impossible to determine. They may distrust advisors with an obvious interest in selling the pension products and services of the companies which employ them (ignoring the fact that most`independent' pension advisors are actually on retainers to large financial service companies).
In terms of public policy, three implications deserve mention. Following on from the discussion immediately above, there are reasons to doubt the utility of generic financial advisory services (compare DWP, 2006) . If discounted by those respondents most likely to believe that pension planning is important, these services are, at best, ignored by those without the sophistication needed to make informed judgments about the nature and quality of proffered advice. At worst, generic advisory services may encourage unwarranted confidence among those who can least afford to make errors in pension planning. A second and related implication is that those people able and willing to make plans for the future may benefit from government policy designed to improve the quality and quantity of advice offered by specialist services. This may mean requiring disclosure by advisors about their relationships with financial service companies. A third implication is that the delivery of such advisory services may be best focused on the household, rather than the individual or place of employment. At the margin, there is also evidence for considering regionally targeted advisory programmesöeven if we share with many recent concerns about the effectiveness of financial literacy programmes in general (see Atkinson, 2008) .
